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Recent observers have pointed to a growing polarization within the
U.S. public over politicized moral issues—the so-called culture wars.
DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson studied trends over the past 25 years
in American opinion on a number of critical social issues, finding
little evidence of increased polarization; abortion is the primary ex-
ception. However, their conclusions are suspect because they treat
ordinal or nominal scales as interval data. This article proposes new
methods for studying polarization using ordinal data and uses these
to model the National Election Study (NES) abortion item. Whereas
the analysis of this item by DiMaggio et al. points to increasing
polarization of abortion attitudes between 1972 and 1994, this ar-
ticle’s analyses of these data offers little support for this conclusion
and lends weight to their view that recent concerns over polarization
are overstated.
INTRODUCTION
Is America wracked by “culture wars”—divisive debates in the media
over issues such as abortion rights, affirmative action, homosexuality,
public funding for the arts, and so on—that polarize public opinion into
opposing viewpoints? According to proponents of the “culture wars hy-
pothesis,” the erosion of a common ground for reasoned ethical debate
makes it difficult to resolve politicized moral issues and portends dan-
1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1998 Chicago winter meetings
of the methodology section of the American Sociological Association. We would like
to thank Robert Kaufman, Yu Xie, Paul DiMaggio, and the AJS reviewers for com-
ments and suggestions. Direct correspondence to Ted Mouw, Department of Sociology,
CB 3210, 155 Hamilton Hall, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Car-
olina 27599-3210. E-mail: tedmouw@email.unc.edu
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gerous escalations in levels of social conflict (Hunter 1991, 1994; Bennet
1992; Gitlin 1995; Hochschild 1995). This same concern is echoed in the
lay literature on contemporary politics (e.g., Shor 1986; Bolton 1992; Ja-
coby 1994; Bloom 1992; Gates 1992; Hartman 1991), as well as in the
press. The Washington Post reported that between 1993 and 1996 there
were approximately 1,500 articles in the media referring to contemporary
American “culture wars.”2 Apparently, the public also believes that Amer-
icans are culturally fragmented, with 86% of the respondents to a 1995
Newsweek poll agreeing that Americans share fewer common values now
than in the past.
Others claim the concerns above are overblown, arguing that public
opinion data indicate that the majority of people do not hold “extreme”
views on divisive social issues (Brint 1992; Dillon 1996). For example,
most national surveys about abortion show that the majority of Americans
think abortion should neither be strictly legal or illegal in all circumstances
(Blake and Del Pinal 1981; Gallup Poll News Service 1998). However,
this does not address the basic question posed by the culture wars hy-
pothesis: while public debate in America has always been contentious, is
there something special about the contemporary “culture wars” that makes
Americans more polarized now on important social issues than they were
in the past? To address this hypothesis, it is not sufficient to measure
polarization at a single point in time—we need to model trends in po-
larization over time.
In an important recent article, DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996, p.
693) argued that polarization as a state “refers to the extent to which
opinions on an issue are opposed in relation to some theoretical maxi-
mum,” while polarization as a process “refers to the increase in such
opposition over time.” To investigate polarization in the latter sense, they
examine the change in variance and kurtosis of opinion items over time,
with increasing variance and declining kurtosis taken to evidence polar-
ization. Using time series of items from the General Social Survey (GSS)
and National Election Study (NES), spanning the period 1972–94,
DiMaggio et al. find no evidence for polarization of attitudes concerning
crime and justice, gender, race, and sexual morality. They do find that
attitudes toward abortion polarized over this period. However, their con-
clusions are suspect because they apply statistical methods appropriate
for interval data to data that are nominal or ordinal. For example, to
study trends in the binary GSS abortion items, they create a scale by
summing the scores for each item and treating the resulting scale as in-
terval (in general, scales created in this fashion are not even ordinal). To
analyze the four-category ordinal NES abortion item, they score the re-
2 Washington Post, February 23, 1997, final ed., p. C5.
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sponse categories 1, 2, 3, 4, and treat the resulting data as interval (see
app. B, table B1). However, it is misleading to treat ordinal data as interval
data because the scores assigned to the categories are arbitrary—only the
relative ranking of the categories is known.
Our article makes several contributions. We develop appropriate meth-
ods for studying polarization in ordinal variables, using these to model
trends in attitudes toward abortion and to ascertain whether or not po-
larization is increasing. We proceed as follows. First, we discuss the rel-
evance of the abortion issue to the literature on culture wars and review
previous work on trends in abortion attitudes. In the data and methods
section, we describe the ordinal NES abortion item analyzed by DiMaggio
et al. (1996) and several problems with their analysis, subsequently ex-
positing (in context) the generalization of the cumulative probit model we
developed to make inferences about trends in latent attitudes toward
abortion. (A general discussion of the model and its implementation—in
the Stata software package—is given in app. A.) We treat the observed
NES item as an ordinal variable, making the usual type of assumption
that responses to this item are the result of quantizing a normally dis-
tributed latent attitude, and we develop models that are consistent with
this assumption. Using the models, we find no evidence for an increase
in polarization between 1972 and 1980. While several other models offer
some support for the view that polarization increased between 1980 and
1994, our best-fitting models, derived from theoretical considerations, do
not support this view; a number of other considerations also suggest the
superiority of these models over those that give evidence of polarization.
Thus, as abortion is the exemplar issue in much of the culture wars
literature, our findings suggest that the concerns expressed therein are
overstated.
SOCIAL CONFLICT OVER ABORTION RIGHTS: CULTURE WARS?
“Culture wars” may be characterized as conflicts over issues that are
rooted in nonnegotiable conceptions of cultural and moral order (Hunter
1991, 1996; Wuthnow 1996). According to Wuthnow and Hunter, these
conflicts stem from a breakdown of the old denominational religious loy-
alties in America, with the traditional denominations splitting along a
crosscutting conservative/liberal or orthodox/progressive divide that
threatens the normative consensus (Davis and Robinson 1996). Hunter
(1991) argues that the orthodox side stresses scriptural inerrancy and the
belief that God is the ultimate arbiter of right and wrong, while pro-
gressives claim that morality is a human construct that is constantly evolv-
ing. Disagreement based upon fundamentally different moral frameworks
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is especially difficult to resolve given the lack of common ground between
opposing viewpoints. Instead of a substantial number of moderates who
can work toward compromise, the spectrum of opinion is increasingly
polarized into irreconcilable viewpoints. Unable to negotiate between
these competing moral views, debate thereby ceases to be an attempt to
convince the opposition with reason and becomes instead a struggle for
the power to impose a particular moral order. For these reasons, the new
moral divisions in U.S. society create polarizing tendencies (Hunter 1991,
p. 43). Furthermore, even if the majority of the population is “middle of
the road,” it is argued that people will adopt more extreme views over
time (Nolan 1996). According to Hunter (1991), this sort of discord is
especially dangerous because it is antidemocratic—each side’s position is
seen as a fundamental right that transcends the democratic process. He
argues that the metaphor “culture wars” should be taken literally: “Vio-
lence? The suggestion that violence can occur is not made lightly: culture
wars always precede shooting wars. It is culture, after all, that justifies
the use of violence. We are truly in the midst of a culture war of great
social and historical significance” (1993, p. 30).
Moreover, the divisions between competing moral visions are so deep
“there is no resolution to the culture war in America” (Hunter 1996, p.
253). If culture wars lead to increasing opinion polarization, then the
decline in the proportion of people with moderate views makes it difficult
to resolve politicized moral issues and may increase the likelihood that
advocacy groups will resort to violence to impose their views.
The dispute over abortion rights appears to epitomize the foregoing
arguments (Hunter 1994), as witnessed by a number of recent books whose
titles call attention to the presumed irreconcilable viewpoints of the parties
to this conflict: Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (Tribe 1992), No Neutral
Ground: Abortion Politics in the Age of Absolutes (O’Connor 1996), The
Abortion Dilemma (Claire 1995), and Between Two Absolutes: Public
Opinion and the Politics of Abortion (Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox 1992). In
an ethnographic study of abortion activists, Luker (1984, p. 2) argues that
pro-choice activist women “share almost no common premises and very
little common language” with antiabortion activist women; in particular,
the worldviews and conceptions of motherhood held by the two different
groups of women are antithetical. Hunter (1994) argues that activist or-
ganizations further contribute to opinion polarization by conducting “sym-
bolic warfare” with their opponents. According to him, activists on both
sides of the abortion dispute attempt to coerce consent by relying on
rhetorical distortions and emotional appeals, with the modern media ex-
acerbating matters by encouraging superficial and confrontational dis-
course. Thus, the debate over abortion is reduced to a struggle over in-
flammatory images that limits the possibilities for compromise: the coat
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hanger for pro-choice groups and grisly pictures of aborted fetuses for
pro-life groups. A pro-life activist interviewed by Hunter (1994, p. 67)
states, “This is a visual war we’re fighting here [because of] the 30-second
sound-bite society we live in.” Hunter concludes that the outcome of this
sort of discourse is a “thinning out” of the middle ground, reducing the
chances for democratic compromise.
Others do not view the abortion dispute as a clash between irrecon-
cilable views. Ginsburg’s (1989) study suggests that although pro-life and
pro-choice activists come to hold different opinions on abortion, there are
also significant commonalities in their views, with both types of activists
emphasizing the importance of nurturance, for example. Dillon (1996)
argues that the public opinion literature indicates that Americans have
complex and nuanced views about abortion that are not readily under-
stood using a simple orthodox/progressive dichotomy. She also argues,
from her work on the language of the abortion debate, that the level of
rhetorical complexity featured here is similar to the level encountered in
political discussions of other issues. According to her, activists on both
sides of the fence use arguments that attempt to engage those with op-
posing views, as opposed to summarily dismissing the contrary view out
of hand. If this is the case, then the abortion dispute, while heated, does
not differ from other forms of reasoned democratic discourse, implying
that the concerns of writers on “culture wars” (at least on the abortion
issue) are misdirected.
Nonetheless, Hunter’s concern that increasing polarization portends
outright civil violence should not be taken lightly. As table 1 shows,
abortion violence and protest appear to have escalated in the first half of
the 1990s, culminating in the murder of five abortion providers in 1993–94.
These acts of violence and social protest, widely reported in the media,
constitute the public face of the conflict over abortion and provide prima
facie evidence for the concerns of Hunter and others who worry that the
divide in U.S. society does not permit a peaceful resolution. However,
some caution is in order. First, the level of violence associated with the
abortion issue seems “small,” perhaps reflecting the actions of isolated
individuals or fringe groups. Second, much of the increase in abortion
protest appears to be picketing, and this type of activity cannot be viewed
as antidemocratic. Thus, to use the type of evidence in table 1 to suggest
that polarization in the U.S. public is spiraling out of control, as some
sociologists and journalists have done, seems unwarranted. Further, even
were the prima facie evidence stronger, it has been argued (Ginsburg 1998;
Risen and Thomas 1998) that in the wake of this violence both pro-life
and pro-choice groups adopted more moderate positions in an attempt to
distance themselves from extremists. Therefore, it is conceivable that re-
cent violence will generate a decline in polarization. Finally, and most
TABLE 1
Incidents against Abortion Providers, 1977–94
1977–83 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Violence:
Murder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Attempted murder . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 8
Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 18 4 2 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 3
Arson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6 8 7 4 4 6 4 10 16 9 6
Protest:
Picketing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 160 139 141 77 151 72 45 292 2,898 2,279 1,407
Clinic blockades . . . . . 0 0 0 0 2 182 201 34 41 83 66 25




important, no matter how tempting it is to do so, it is simply incorrect
to infer the existence of increasing opinion polarization from the very
outcomes such polarization is held to predict; social psychologists inter-
ested in the relationship between attitudes and behavior learned a similar
lesson many years ago.
In short, it seems clear that in order to ascertain whether or not opinions
are becoming more polarized, as argued by Hunter and other writers who
speak of “culture wars,” it is necessary to directly examine opinion data.
Using this type of evidence, Brint (1992) and Dillon (1996) argued that
the proportion of persons holding extreme views on the abortion issue is
not large enough to evidence polarization. However, there are several
problems with these conclusions. Most important, these authors do not
examine time trends, as would be required to ascertain whether or not
levels of polarization are increasing. Second, even if interest resided in
polarization at a single point in time, the definition of an extreme response
is subjective, and these authors offer no criteria for assessing the extent
of polarization. Having concluded that it is necessary to examine trends
in abortion attitudes to assess the validity of the culture wars hypothesis,
we now examine previous work on temporal trends in abortion attitudes.
TRENDS IN ABORTION ATTITUDES
Gauging public opinion about abortion is difficult given the complexity
of the moral and legal issues involved; in addition, responses to opinion
items depend on question wording and order (Jaffe, Lindheim, and Lee
1981; Adamek 1994; Bumpass 1997). Nevertheless, several findings
emerge consistently from the literature. First, at all points in time and on
all major surveys, a substantial proportion of the population does not
think that abortion should be strictly legal or illegal in all circumstances
(see Cook et al. 1992; Hunter 1994). According to a 1998 Gallup poll, this
percentage was 54% in 1975, 48% in 1992, and again 58% in 1998.3 In
this sense, it seems true that a large proportion of the population holds
“middle of the road” views about abortion. Second, support for abortion
varies widely according to the specific circumstances of the abortion. A
large majority of individuals support abortion when the life of the mother
is in danger or in the case of rape or incest. In contrast, there is consid-
erably less support for abortion for social reasons, such as not being able
to afford the child (Gallup Poll News Service 1979; Granberg and Gran-
3 These data were mentioned in an article entitled “Fluctuations, but No Major Change
in Views on Abortion” that was posted at CNN Interactive (http://www.cnn.com/US/
9801/20/abortion.poll/index.html) in 1998. See also Gallup Poll News Service (1998)
and Hall (1998).
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berg 1980; Cook et al. 1992). Third, the level of support for abortion has
been fairly stable since the Roe v. Wade decision. While the level of support
increased substantially from the early 1960s to the early 1970s, there was
little change throughout the rest of the 1970s and a slight decline in the
early 1980s (de Boer 1977; Glenn 1987; Gallup Poll News Service 1979;
Granberg and Granberg 1980; Gillespie, Vergert, and Kingma 1987; Page
and Shapiro 1992). By 1985, the net result was that the level of public
support for abortion in the 1972 and 1985 GSS data is almost identical
(Glenn 1987). Recent opinion data show some fluctuation in the support
for abortion. According to Gallup survey data, between 1975 and 1998,
the percentage of people who thought that abortion should be legal in all
circumstances rose from 21% in 1975 to 29% in 1989 and 34% in 1992,
but has since declined to 23% in 1998 (Gallup Poll News Service 1998).
The remarkable thing about this trend is that, despite these fluctuations,
support for legal abortion is about the same as it was 20 years ago.
However, as Hunter (1994) and DiMaggio et al. (1996) note, aggregate
measures of support for a particular issue—that is, the “average” opin-
ion—fail to measure attitude polarization. To see this, simply imagine the
case where the “average opinion” is temporally stable, with individuals
on both sides of the center moving steadily toward the extremes. While
the average opinion is unchanged, the variance is increasing; substan-
tively, increased variability may make compromise between opposing
views more difficult to obtain.
To address the issue of opinion polarization in abortion attitudes,
DiMaggio et al. (1996) used two sources, the NES and the GSS. The NES
is a biennial survey in which respondents were asked, beginning in 1972,
to express their opinion about abortion on a four-point ordinal scale.
The abortion item was not asked in 1974, but was asked in 1976,
1978, . . . , 1994. DiMaggio et al. scored the categories 1–4 and treated
the resulting data as interval data, calculating (at each time point) the
sample mean, variance, and kurtosis of the item responses; they then
regressed the series of means, variances, and kurtoses against time. In
1980, the NES response codes were changed, but a subset of 1,320 of the
respondents in that year were asked to respond using both the old and
new response codes; for this year, they used only these respondents, de-
fining the respondent’s score as the average of the responses to the old
and new items. Their analysis suggests that, over the study period, the
variability in opinions increased and the kurtosis decreased, evidencing
increasing polarization.
There are two major problems with DiMaggio et al.’s analysis of the
NES data. First, because the NES item is ordinal, it is not appropriate
to calculate means, variances, and the kurtosis of the item. Second,
DiMaggio et al. (1996) pieced the NES data into a single series combining
Culture Wars
921
the old NES item (1972–78), the average of the old and new items (1980),
and the new NES item (1982–94). We discuss these problems further in
the next section and present appropriate statistical methods for assessing
polarization in ordinal opinion items.
Using six binary items on abortion from the GSS, DiMaggio et al. also
constructed a time series (with 14 points) spanning 1977–94. Each item
was initially scored 1 or 2, and the item scores were added, resulting in
a scale value for each respondent. The resulting scale was treated as
interval data, and the data were analyzed as above. According to the
authors, opinion was already sharply divided at the onset of the series in
1977, and polarization increased over the study period, as evidenced by
increasing dispersion and declining kurtosis, with the decrease in kurtosis
leveling off by the mid-1980s. This analysis is also problematic, as scales
constructed in such a fashion need not even be ordinal, and even if the
items are “unidimensional,” that does not mean that a scale constructed
in the manner above is interval. To analyze these data properly, it would
be necessary either to examine the trends in each item separately or to
construct a probabilistic model of the response process with an underlying
latent attitude toward abortion.
Because the methods we present for analyzing polarization using an
ordinal item are not necessarily appropriate for analyzing the GSS items,
these data are not analyzed in this article. Although we do not accept the
conclusions DiMaggio et al. reached using these data, the reader should
note that it is possible that the GSS data, were they are analyzed properly,
might still suggest that attitudes toward abortion polarized. We return to
that issue in the discussion.
DATA AND METHODS
The NES is conducted biennially by the Institute for Social Research at
the University of Michigan. The NES sample that we use is a nationally
representative probability sample of all households in the United States.
In 1992 and 1994, some of the NES respondents are panel respondents
in ongoing longitudinal studies. For each year, the nonpanel respondents
constitute a nationally representative sample, but the panel respondents
do not; thus, only the nonpanel respondents are used in the analysis. Table
2 displays the the time series of data for both old and new questions.
Comparison of the response codes in table B1 reveals that the new item
emphasizes the legality of abortion, while the old one does not, suggesting
the two items do not measure the same latent attitude toward abortion.
If this is the case, it was inappropriate for DiMaggio et al. to combine
the two items to form a single series and then examine this series for
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TABLE 2











1972 . . . 11.2 46.9 17.3 24.5 100 2,619
1976 . . . 11.3 45.7 16.3 26.8 100 1,822
1978 . . . 10.9 44.6 16.8 27.6 100 2,187
1980 . . . 9.8 44.7 18.0 27.5 100 1,362
New:
1980 . . . 11.5 32.7 19.0 36.8 100 1,547
1982 . . . 13.3 30.8 19.6 36.4 100 1,359
1984 . . . 13.3 30.3 20.0 36.4 100 2,171
1986 . . . 13.4 29.0 18.4 39.3 100 2,120
1988 . . . 12.7 33.2 18.5 35.6 100 1,996
1990 . . . 12.2 33.2 14.4 40.2 100 1,932
1992 . . . 10.8 26.2 13.8 49.2 100 1,087
1994 . . . 12.6 30.8 14.7 42.0 100 994
Note.—Data are from the National Election Study. For 1992–94, sample excludes panel study mem-
bers. See table B1 for a description of the categories.
trends. To address this important issue further, we use the 1,320 NES
respondents who answered both the old and new abortion items in 1980.
Table 3 contains the percentages, means, and variances for both sets of
questions. Table 4 contains the cross-classification of responses to both
sets of questions. If these items measure the same latent attitude and the
relationship between the latent attitude and observed responses is the
same for both items, the marginal distributions (see table 3) of the two
items will be identical. If the two marginal distributions are not identical,
either (1) the two items do not measure the same latent variable, in which
case it is not appropriate to combine the years 1972–78 with the years
1980–94, or (2) the relationship between the latent attitude and the ob-
served response is not identical for the two items, in which case assigning
identical sets of scores to the two items and examining trends over the
full period 1972–94 almost certainly confounds the item change in 1980
with any possible true attitudinal change. Inspection of table 3 suggests
that the 1980–94 question elicits a lower level of response in category 2
and a higher level of response in category 4; further, the null hypothe-
sis—that the two marginal distributions are identical—is rejected.4 There-
4 To ascertain whether or not the distributions of the old and new NES items are
identical, we test for marginal homogeneity in the cross-classifications of old by new
responses for the 1,320 respondents in 1980 who answered both itmes. The data are
given in table 4. Because the log-linear model of quasi-symmetry (QS) fits these data




Old and New Abortion Questions in 1980,
Percentages, Means, and Variances
Question/Category Old New
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.9 12.0
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44.2 32.1
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.2 18.7
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.7 37.2
Total . . . . . . . . . 100.0 100.0
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.64 2.81
Variance . . . . . . . . . . .983 1.14
Note.—N p 1,320.
fore, the two items should not be combined into a single time series, as
was the case in DiMaggio et al.5
To understand the effect of the change in question wording on the
conclusions drawn by DiMaggio et al., we need to compare their analysis
(described previously) with an analysis that adjusts the series of means,
variances, and kurtoses for this change. To perform these adjustments,
we (see table 3), used the 1980 data on the 1,320 respondents who an-
swered both the old and new NES items, treating these data as interval
data, as was done in DiMaggio et al. (1996). The means of the old and
new items are, respectively, 2.638 and 2.811, which yields an estimate of
the effect (on the mean) due to the change in wording as 2.811 
; we therefore added .173 to the means for the pre-1980 data.2.638 p .173
For the data from 1980–94, we used the mean calculated from the new
item. The variance series and the kurtosis series were adjusted similarly,
using .983 for the variance of the old item and 1.140 for the variance of
the new item, and 1.198 for the kurtosis of the old item and 1.319 for
the kurtosis of the new item.
Without adjusting the data for changes due to wording, DiMaggio et
al. (p. 716) regressed their series of means, variances, and kurtoses on
time, leading them to conclude that, between 1972–94, attitudes toward
abortion become more liberal, but also more polarized, as evidenced by
increasing variability and decreasing kurtosis. Using the adjusted mean
series, the estimated slope is .008 (SE p .003; P p .011), slightly smaller
than the estimated slope in DiMaggio et al.; For the variance series, the
statistic and P denotes the P-value (based on L2), marginal homogeneity is equivalent
to symmetry (S) (Agresti 1990, p. 390). therefore, the null hypothesis may be tested
using the conditional likelihood ratio test ( ;2 2L [S]  L [QS] p 133.69  7.21 p 125.48
; ); clearly, this leads to rejection at any conventional level of significance.df p 3 P ! .001
5 One could overcome this problem if plausible adjustments were made to compensate
for the effect of the change in wording.
American Journal of Sociology
924
TABLE 4
Cross-Classification of Responses to the Old and New
Abortion Questions, 1980
New Question/Category
Old Question/Category 1 2 3 4 Total
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 40 7 8 130
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 334 120 57 584
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 36 90 107 240
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 14 30 319 366
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 424 247 491 1,320
Note.—Source: National Election Study, 1980.
estimated slope is .003 (SE p .0009; P p .009); although the estimated
slope is now substantially smaller than that reported by DiMaggio et al.,
note that it is still significantly different from zero at the .05 level, indic-
ative of increasing polarization. For the kurtosis, the estimate is .004
(SE p .003; Pp .163); in DiMaggio et al., the slope is .013, significantly
different from zero at the .05 level.
Our calculations suggest that when the ordinal NES item is adjusted
for the change in item wording, but still inappropriately treated as interval
data, there is still evidence (although not as strong as before) of increasing
polarization. Similarly, our calculations suggest that attitudes became
more liberal, but not to the extent suggested by DiMaggio et al. However,
these calculations do not bear on the implicit assumption that the old and
new NES items measure the same attitude.
Because the old NES item makes no reference to the legality of
abortion—and therefore seems to tap personal beliefs, while the new NES
item refers to legality and therefore seems to tap something other than
purely personal beliefs—we do not believe it is reasonable to think the
old and new items measure the same attitude. Therefore, in this article,
we model the old NES abortion item using the data from 1972–78 and
the respondents who answered the old item in 1980, and we separately
model the new NES abortion item using the data from 1980–94. We ask
whether polarization increased between 1972 and 1980 (using the old item)
and whether or not polarization increased between 1980 and 1994 (using
the new item).
The Model
We now discuss a model for ordinal dependent variables that allows us
to more appropriately assess whether or not attitudes toward abortion
have polarized in the past 25 years. The model we use to analyze the
Culture Wars
925
data in table 2 is a cumulative probit model with heteroscedasticity and
variable cutpoints. A general discussion of the model and its estimation
is given in appendix A; here we exposit the model within the context of
a four-point ordinal scale. In the usual cumulative probit model for an
ordinal scale Y with 4 categories, a latent variable indexing the unobserved
attitude of respondent i at time t (for convenience of exposition, we index
the time points t p 1, . . . , T) is postulated to follow a regression model:
∗Y p m   , (1)it t it
where is the mean response for time t, and is a normally distributedm t it
error with mean zero and variance . The relationship between and2 ∗j Yit
the observed variable (the response on the four-point scale) is assumed∗Yit
to be of the form if , if , if∗ ∗Y p 1 Y ≤ t Y p 2 t ! Y ≤ t Y p 3it it 1 it 1 it 2 it
, and if , where t1, t2, and t3 are the category
∗ ∗t ! Y ≤ t Y p 4 Y 1 t2 it 3 it it 3
cutpoints. As is well known, not all the parameters t p2(t ,t ,t ,j ,m ,1 2 3 t
1, . . . , T) of the cumulative probit model are identified, and two restrictions
must be imposed to set the location and scale of the latent attitude Y∗.
Typically, the restrictions and are used, although other2t p 0 j p 11
identifying rules may be more useful in particular applications, as herein.
A graphical interpretation of the model can also be given (see fig. 1).
Respondents with fewer than units of the latent attitude Y∗ an-t p 11
swer the NES item using response category 1, while respondents between
and units choose response category 2, and so on.t p 1 t p 01 1
The usual cumulative probit model cannot be used to model opinion
polarization because the variance of the latent attitude is constrained to
be the same at all time points in this model. We remove this deficiency,
allowing the variance of the latent attitude to depend on time (see Sobel
[1998] for closely related material). In addition, we allow for the possibility
that one or more of the cutpoints may change over time; this feature is
demonstrated in our empirical analysis. In previous work, Terza (1985)
allowed for variable cutpoints in the cumulative probit model, and
McCullagh and Nelder (1989) discussed extensions of the proportional
odds model where the variance is allowed to depend on independent
variables. We also note that the kurtosis of any normal distribution is
zero. Were we, following DiMaggio et al. (1996), to argue that declining
kurtosis evidences bimodality and is therefore also necessary for estab-
lishing increasing polarization and were our model to fit the data, the
null hypothesis of no increase in polarization would be accepted (even if
the variance was increasing). There are two problems with such an ar-
gument. First, kurtosis does not indicate bimodality (Balanda and
MacGillivray 1988). Second, in our view, bimodality does not necessarily
evidence polarization; just consider the case where the modes are “very
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Fig. 1.—Hypothesized effect of the 1989 Webster decision on the category 3 cutpoint, t3
close.” However, in our view, it is intuitively clear that an increase in the
variance of normally distributed random variable evidences increasing
polarization.
Under our model, the parameters of substantive interest are (themt
mean at time t) and (the variance at time t), t p 1, . . . , T. To identify2jt
the model, we set and to zero and one, respectively (for all timet t1 2
periods). In a number of the models considered later, the cutpoint ist3
allowed to change over time. Using these identification rules, a mean
indicates that more than half the respondents at time t respondm 1 0t
using category 3 or category 4, while fewer than half the respondents use
these categories if The variances are also not identified, but fixingm ! 0.t
the cutpoints identifies the scale of the latent variable. As a result, the
absolute magnitude of the variance is not meaningful herein, but the
relative sizes of the variances are identified; that is, the variances can be
compared over time. We test the culture wars hypothesis that polarization
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is increasing over time by looking for trends in the variance of the latent
variable.
The method of maximum likelihood is used to estimate the model.
Under the usual types of regularity conditions (met here), the parameter
estimates are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed in large
samples. The computations were performed using the software package
Stata (StataCorp 1997; for further details, such as the log likelihood and
the first and second derivatives, see app. A).
FINDINGS
Old NES Item, 1972–80
We begin by analyzing the old NES item for the years 1972–80 (see table
2). For comparative purposes, we first note that DiMaggio et al. would
have found no trend in the variance (slope p .003; SE p .004) of the
old NES question between 1972 and 1980 by inappropriately treating the
data in the upper part of table 2 as interval data and regressing the series
of variances on time.6 Table 5 presents model evaluation statistics for a
number of the models we fit to these data (models H1–H5). The Bayesian
information criterion, or BIC (Raftery 1995) is calculated here as L 2
. Lower levels of BIC indicate preferred models. Indf # ln (N of cases)
this article, we use L2 to assess the model fit, and we use BIC as a secondary
selection criterion.
First, we considered model H1. In this model, the cutpoint is constant
across years, but the means and variances are allowed to differ in each
year. To insure that the cutpoint , we parameterized the model usingt 1 03
ln(t3); similarly, we estimated . To obtain the residual degrees of
2ln(j )t
freedom for this model, note that nine parameters are estimated: one
cutpoint, , and two parameters for each of the four time points—thet3
mean of the latent variable and the variance . In addition, at each2m jt t
time, the response proportions must add to one, imposing four additional
constraints. Thus, the number of constraints on the 16 proportions is 13,
hence there are 3 df. The degrees of freedom for the models subsequently
considered can be determined analogously. It is evident that H1 fits the
data adequately; the P-value associated with L2(H1) is .87. That is, our
latent variable model accounts for the distribution of the observed NES
item.
We now ask whether or not the variances increased over the study
period, considering model H2, in which the variances (but not the means)
6 In addition, for the mean series, the estimated slope is .010; SE p .001; for the
kurtosis series, the estimated slope is .015; SE p .004; P p .073.
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are equal in all years; this model also fits the data adequately ( )P p .71
and H1 does not fit the data better (
2 2L [H ]  L [H ] p 3; df p 3; P p2 1
). Thus, we conclude (for the old NES item) that there is no polari-.391
zation between 1972 and 1980.
We also ask if there is a trend in the means between 1972 and 1980.
Model H3 is the special case of H1 in which the means are constant between
1972 and 1980; comparing H3 with H1 ; ;
2 2(L [H ]  L [H ] p 7.52 df p 33 1
) suggests the means may vary over this period. Similarly, modelP p .057
H4 is the special case of H2 in which the means are constant between
1972 and 1980, and comparison of H4 with H2 again points to variability
in the means ( ). Therefore, we fit2 2L [H ]  L [H ] p 7.07; df p 3; P p .0674 2
model H5 with constant variance and a linear trend in the mean; this
model fits the data almost as well as H2, but with two fewer parameters.
In addition, H5 is clearly preferred over H4 on the basis of the likelihood
ratio test ( ); further, although the2 2L [H ]  L [H ] p 7.07; df p 1; P p .0084 5
BIC statistic would suggest favoring H4 over H5, the difference between
the two values is trivial.
New NES Item, 1980–94
Next, we model the new NES item between 1980 and 1994. If DiMaggio
et al. (1996) had analyzed this series by inappropriately treating the
1980–94 data in table 2 as interval and regressing the series of means,
the natural logarithm of the variances, and the kurtosis series on time,
they would have concluded that there is strong evidence that attitudinal
variability increased between 1980 and 1994 (slope .004; SE p .001), and
somewhat weaker evidence suggesting that attitudes may have liberalized
over this period (slope .009; SE p .005). For the kurtosis series, the slope
is .0013 with standard error .004.7
Table 5 presents model evaluation statistics for a number of the models
we considered. Under model M1, the means and variances are allowed to
vary across survey years; however, the cutpoint does not vary by year.t3
It is evident that this model does not fit the data adequately ( ).P ! .001
However, before concluding that the data are incompatible with the hy-
pothesis of a normally distributed latent attitude toward legalized abor-
tion, we reexamine the assumption in model M1 that the cutpoints are
constant from 1980 to 1994. It is important to note that by allowing all
the cutpoints to vary freely over time, the proportions in table 2 can be
reproduced exactly. That is, a model with variable cutpoints can always
be obtained that will fit these data, whether or not the model correctly
describes the underlying process generating the data. Consequently, we




Model Evaluation Statistics for Models of Attitudes toward
Legalized Abortion
Model Description L2 BIC df
1972–80 data:
H1 . . . . . . . . . Fit all means and variances and t3 .72 26.24 3
H2 . . . . . . . . . H1 with constant variance 3.72 50.20 6
H3 . . . . . . . . . H1 with constant means 8.24 45.68 6
H4 . . . . . . . . . H2 with constant means 10.89 69.98 9
H5 . . . . . . . . . H2 with linear trend in means 3.82 68.07 8
1980–94 data:
M1 . . . . . . . . . Fit all means and variances and t3 35.28 31.14 7
M2 . . . . . . . . . M1 with t3 change for 1990–94 6.14 50.79 6
M3 . . . . . . . . . M2 with constant variance 19.91 103.43 13
M4 . . . . . . . . . M2 with linear trend in ln(variance) t3 19.58 94.28 12
M5 . . . . . . . . . M2 with different variance in 1986 13.16 99.70 12
M6 . . . . . . . . . M3 with constant means 46.88 142.88 20
M7 . . . . . . . . . M3 with linear trend in means 44.94 135.33 19
M8 . . . . . . . . . M6 with different mean in 1992 24.25 156.03 19
M9 . . . . . . . . . M1  linear trend in ln(variance) 49.03 74.32 13
M10 . . . . . . . . M1 constant variance with different
variance in 1986 and 1990–94
42.72 71.14 12
M11 . . . . . . . . M2 constant means with different
mean in 1992
68.91 101.88 18
believe that models with variable cutpoints are useful only when theo-
retical considerations strongly suggest their use, and we would further
argue that hypotheses about cutpoint changes should be empirically
testable.
To begin our reexamination, note that for categories 1 and 2 in table
B1, the language in the NES abortion item clearly specifies the circum-
stances under which the law should permit abortion, but this is not the
case for category 3. Whereas the phrase “permit abortion for reasons other
than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life” demarcates response
category 3 from category 2, the circumstances that constitute the clear
establishment of a need for an abortion are not fixed by the item, leaving
respondents to demarcate the choice between categories 3 and 4. Signif-
icantly, the item also does not say who establishes the “need” for an
abortion. Is it the woman and her doctor, or is it the state? As a result
of this ambiguity, we believe that there are good reasons to suspect that
changes in the public discourse on abortion rights caused this point of
demarcation to change after 1989 as the result of media and activist
organizations’ response to the 1989 Webster decision. In July 1989, the
Supreme Court, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, rendered the
most important legal ruling on abortion since Roe v. Wade in 1973. The
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Webster decision ruled that restrictions on access to legal abortions were
not unconstitutional, upholding a Missouri statute prohibiting the use of
public facilities to perform abortion and requiring physicians to test for
fetal viability after 20 weeks of pregnancy (Cook 1998).
The Webster ruling indicated that states could now attempt to restrict
abortion access (Garrow 1994), and as a result, the abortion issue was
thrust into the political arena as state legislatures proposed legislation
restricting public funding for abortions, requiring parental consent, and
testing for fetal viability (Saletan 1997). Subsequently, the Supreme
Court’s willingness to approve restrictive legislation in Webster was sup-
ported by the 1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey decision, which upheld
the constitutionality of restrictive legislation in Pennsylvania that required
a 24-hour waiting period for abortions, parental consent, and reports on
abortions performed in publicly funded institutions. Currently, 29 states
have passed legislation requiring parental consent of minors’ abortion
decisions, 14 require a delay following state-directed counseling, 13 restrict
private or public insurance coverage, 34 restrict Medicaid coverage, and
26 restrict postviability abortions.8
Although most people may not understand the intricacies of the Webster
decision (see Hunter [1994] for a depiction of the public’s poor under-
standing of Supreme Court rulings about abortion), we argue that the
public discourse on abortion after Webster affected respondents’ inter-
pretation of the NES abortion item. In particular, we argue that the public
discourse affected the semantics of category 3 of the NES question (see
app. B), which stresses the legitimacy of abortion under the subjectively
defined circumstances of “clearly established need,” by associating it with
increased government control over what is and is not a legitimate abortion.
Even though the proposed restrictions of the Webster decision may not
prohibit most women from obtaining abortions, many pro-choice organ-
izations viewed them as a direct threat to the Roe v. Wade framework.
The National Organization for Women, for example, has argued that
although late-term abortions constitute only a tiny fraction of all abortions,
bans on late-term and partial-birth abortions are worded ambiguously
and “are intended to restrict access to all abortions.”9 In a review of the
politics of abortion rights, Saletan (1997) argued that the Webster case
galvanized the pro-choice movement to reframe its defense of abortion
rights. For example, the National Abortion Rights Action League
8 See The Status of Major Abortion-Related Laws and Policies in the States, December
31, 2000, Alan Guttmacher Institute special report at http://www.agi-usa.org
/pubs/abort_law_status.html
9 Issue Report: Abortion Procedure Bans, NOW at http://www.now.org/issues
/abortion/laterep.html; we viewed this document in 1999.
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(NARAL) adopted the new slogan “Who Decides—You or Them?” Saletan
(1997, p. 118) argues that the value of this slogan was that it could appeal
to a broader audience: “Voters with conservative instincts who shied away
from the outright prohibition of immoral behavior could embrace
NARAL’s new message as a rejection of big government. In the minds
of these voters, ‘them’ meant nosy, corrupt politicians and bureaucrats;
‘you’ meant families and communities.”
Before the Webster decision, many NES respondents may have assumed
that establishing the “need” for an abortion was the result of a private
decision between a woman and her doctor. At the time, support for abor-
tion in cases where the desire for an abortion was established in consul-
tation with a doctor was high. For example, before the Webster decision,
a CBS/New York Times survey in April 1989 indicated that 72% of those
with opinions said that “if a woman wants to have an abortion and her
doctor agrees to it,” she should be allowed to have an abortion (Dionne
1989). However, the abortion discourse post-Webster encourages respon-
dents to think that state governments will increasingly intervene in the
doctor-patient relationship by placing additional restrictions on abortions
that weaken the original legal framework of Roe v. Wade. In other words,
who will decide when the need for an abortion has been “clearly estab-
lished”—the woman and her doctor or the state? As a result, respondents
may now associate the ambiguous language of the third category of the
NES abortion question with increased state control over what constitutes
a legitimate need for abortion. We argue that, as a result, the cutpoint
separating categories 3 and 4 decreased post-Webster.
The rationale for the foregoing argument can also be seen from figure
1. Respondents whose latent attitude toward abortion (Y∗) is less than 1
respond that the law should never permit abortion. Similarly, respondents
with values of Y∗ between 1 and 0 respond that the law should permit
abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the mother’s life. In
both of these cases, the circumstances under which abortion is permissible
are clearly specified by the item, and thus there is no reason to hypothesize
a change in cutpoints pre- and post-Webster. Now consider two hypo-
thetical respondents. Suppose that while the first respondent would en-
dorse abortion in circumstances other than rape, incest, or danger to the
mother’s life, he/she also favors restrictive legislation requiring fetal vi-
ability testing, parental consent, or bans on public funds for abortions.
In terms of figure 1, this respondent’s value of Y∗ is between 0 and ,t3v
where represents the dividing line between those who agree or do nott3v
agree with increased state control over what constitutes a legitimate abor-
tion. In contrast, suppose the second respondent does not agree with these
proposed restrictions, but also does not think abortion should be legal in
every situation. In terms of figure 1, this respondent’s value of Y∗ is
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between and . If the NES item analyzed here were administered tot t3 3v
these two respondents prior to 1989, both will answer the item using
response category 3.
However, as argued above, the discourse on abortion rights after 1989
may cause the cutpoint to decrease because the phrase “clearly estab-t3
lished need” is now associated with the threat of increased state con-
trol—fetal viability tests, parental consent laws, bans on public funding
etc. How would this affect individual responses to the NES abortion
question? After the ruling, the first respondent will still answer using
response category 3 despite the shift in the third cutpoint, because he or
she agrees with the proposed restrictions. In contrast, however, the second
respondent is now forced to choose either category 4, requiring him/her
to endorse abortion under a wider range of circumstances than he/she
would ideally want to permit, or to choose category 3, which is now
associated with increased state control in regulating a woman’s “need”
for an abortion. Presumably, if the second respondent’s value of Y∗ is
“very close” to , he/she will choose category 3, and if this value is “veryt3v
close” to , category 4 will be chosen. Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize,t3
as herein, that there is a point , between and such that respondentst t t3a 3 3v
with more than units of Y∗ choose category 4, while respondents witht3a
between 0 and units of Y∗ choose category 3. is not the same as thet t3a 3a
hypothetical cutpoint because represents the dividing line betweent t3 3v v
respondents based upon the hypothetical division of category 3 into two
distinct categories (resulting in a total of 5 categories). In contrast, t3a
represents the shift of the cutpoint dividing categories 3 and 4 in the case
where there are only 4 categories. In other words, after the Webster de-
cision, the third cutpoint shifts to the left from to .t t3 3a
In light of this hypothesized effect of the abortion discourse after 1989
on the NES item, we modified model M1, allowing the cutpoint separating
categories 3 and 4 to change in 1990 and subsequent years. The resulting
model (M2) fits the data very well ( ), and the estimated cutpointsP p .41
(standard errors in parentheses) for the first and second time periods are,
respectively, .495 and .364, consistent with our hypothesis that the cutpoint
is smaller in 1990 and thereafter. To test whether or not there is a sig-
nificant difference between the two cutpoints, recall that we estimated
the natural logarithms of these quantities; on this scale, the difference
between the two maximum-likelihood estimates is p .305ˆ ˆln (t )  ln (t )3 3a
(SE p .057). Hence a one-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the cut-
points are identical versus the alternative that the second is smaller leads
to rejecting the null in favor of the alternative at the .001 level.
We now ask whether or not the variance of abortion attitudes increased
over the period 1980–94. To address this issue, we consider model M3, in
which the variance is constant and the means are unrestricted. This model
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Fig. 2.—Trends in the mean and variance of abortion attitudes 1980–94 under model M2
also fits the data adequately ( ), consistent with the conclusion ofP 1 .05
no trend in the variance. However, the conditional likelihood ratio test
of M3 versus M2 ( ) has P value of .055,
2 2L [M ]  L [M ] p 13.77; df p 73 2
suggesting possible heterogeneity in the variation across years. DiMaggio
et al. (1996) fit a linear model to the variance estimates in their data,
claiming the variance increases over time. In model M4, the logarithms
of the variances follow a linear model: From2ln (j ) p a  b(t  1980).t
table 5 it is clear that the data offer no grounds for preferring M4 to M3,
as there is almost no improvement in L2 at the cost of one degree of
freedom ( ); that is, the null hypothesis of2 2L [M ]  L [M ] p 0.33; df p 13 4
no linear trend in the variance is not rejected.]
Figure 2 plots the estimated means and variances under model M2
against time; recall that because these parameters are identified only up
to location and scale, only comparisons amongst the means and the var-
iances are of interest. The estimated fluctuate irregularly, consistent2jt
with the hypothesis that the variation does not increase between 1980
and 1994. However, although there is no obvious trend in these estimates,
it also appears that the variance may be larger in 1986 or 1992 than in
the other years; similarly, the variance may be smaller in 1990 than in
the other years. Ex post facto, this suggests considering models where the
variance may be smaller (larger) in a given year than in other years, testing
such models against M3. There are eight such models, each adding a single
parameter to M2. If we had a priori substantive reasons for focusing on
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pre specified years, then it would be legitimate to estimate a subset of
these models, but as this is not the case, all eight models should be con-
sidered, which raises the issue of overfitting the data. Therefore, to test
the null hypothesis of constant variation against the alternative of non-
constant variance, we test each model against M3 using a significance
level of .05/8 (Miller 1981). Of the eight models considered, the best fitting
(M5) allows the variance to differ in 1986. However, the likelihood-ratio
test of M5 versus M3 is not significant at the .05/8 level, and the BIC
statistic (Raftery 1995) suggests that M3 should be preferred to M5.
To this point, the results suggest selecting either M2 or M3 as the pre-
ferred model; importantly, neither of these suggests that attitudes toward
legalized abortion have polarized over the period 1980–94. Of course,
many models other than those considered here are nested between M2
and M3. However, because we think it unlikely that the conclusions about
polarization one would draw from M2 or M3 would change by choosing
such a model, we limit our selection to these two models, choosing M3
over M2 on the basis of the BIC statistic.
Having established that the variance did not increase between 1980
and 1994, we now turn attention to modeling the means, using M3 as a
baseline model. We first compare model M6, in which the means are
constant, with model M3; the conditional likelihood-ratio test (
2L [M ] 6
) suggests some heterogeneity. Following2L [M ] p 26.97; df p 7; P ! .0013
DiMaggio et al. (1996), we model the means as a linear function of time
in model M7; the model does not fit the data as well as M3 (
2L [M ] 7
), and the fit is virtually identical to that2L [M ] p 25.03; df p 6; P ! .0013
of M6.
Figure 2 suggests the mean is larger in 1992 than in the other years;
therefore model M8 allows the mean to differ in this year. Note that model
M3 does not fit better than M8 ( )
2 2L [M ]  L [M ] p 4.34; df p 7; P p .748 3
and that if the BIC statistic is used to select between these models, M8
is preferred. Note also that M8 is preferred to the more parsimonious M6
on these grounds. Finally, although M6 does not fit the data uncondition-
ally at the .05 level, the difference on one degree2 2L (M )  L (M ) p 22.638 6
of freedom suggests a large improvement, and even though the contri-
bution from M6 does not have a chi-square distribution, the chi-square
distribution for differences between L2 values is often approximately valid
in such cases; assuming the validity of this approximation, the P value
is less than .001, substantially less than .05/8.
Our results thus lead to selecting model M8 to describe the data; table
6 reports the estimated variance, the two estimated means ( is the meanm1
for all years except 1992), and the two estimated cutpoints. The estimated
cutpoint prior to the Webster decision is .491, while the estimated cutpoint




Descriptive Statistics for M8
Parameter Estimate SE
ln(t3)
* . . . . . .711 .027
ln(t3a)
† . . . . .995 .041
M1 . . . . . . . .151 .012
m1992 . . . . . .325 .036
ln(s2)‡ . . . . .029 .027
* t p exp(.711) p .491.3
† t p exp(.995) p .369.3a
‡ 2s p exp(.029) p 1.03.
a priori expectations, and the differences between the estimates is signif-
icant, on the basis of a 1 tailed test, at the .001 level of significance.
Although we cannot explain why attitudes are more favorable to legalized
abortion in 1992 than in the other years, the evidence does not support
the hypothesis that Americans are becoming more favorable to legalized
abortion over the study period. Finally, recalling that the variance is
constant and that the kurtosis is also constant because the latent attitude
is normally distributed, the data offer no support for the hypothesis of
increasing polarization.
Our substantive conclusions about the 1980–94 period are obtained
using models for ordinal variables in which the cutpoint separating the
third and fourth categories of the NES item changes after the Webster
decision. The models fit the data well, whereas models that do not allow
this cutpoint change do not fit the data. We have also given good reasons
to expect such a change and correctly specified the direction of this change.
Further, the empirical impact of this change seems reasonable; using the
preferred model M8, in 1990, 14.4% of the respondents are predicted to
fall in category 3, 41.5% in category 4. If the pre-Webster cutpoint were
used instead, 4.6% of the respondents would be reallocated from category
4 to category 3. In addition, the best-fitting model with a cutpoint change
occurs at the time point we identified a priori; no model with a cutpoint
change in another year fits the data at the .05 level. For the model with
a cutpoint shift in 1982, (df p 6; P ! .001). For 19842 2L p 35.3 L p
(df p 6; P ! .001), and for 1986, (df p 6; P ! .001). For233.4 L p 23.3
the model with a shift in 1988, (df p 6; P p .06); the near2L p 11.89
fit of this model is explained by its similarity to M2. For the model with
a cutpoint shift in 1992, (df p 6; P ! .001); for the model with2L p 28.0
a shift in 1994, (df p 6; P ! .001). Despite the strong justifi-2L p 31.3
cations we have given, a critic could always attack our conclusions, ar-
guing that the assumptions used to construct the statistical model are
faulty or that our use of L2 to measure both goodness of fit and aid in
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the model selection process is misguided; for example, obviously one could
argue that instead of a cutpoint change, the latent variable follows some
unspecified distribution other than the normal after 1988. Similarly, as
the model parameters are not identified (see eq. 2 in app. A), conclusions
about the variability of the series can depend on the parameterization of
the model. Although we believe our parameterization offers the most
plausible representation of the behavioral process pre- and post-Webster
respondents might have employed in responding to the new NES item,
a critic could always reject our line of argument. We cannot address all
these potential criticisms, nor can we handle all of these within the mod-
eling framework proposed herein, and even were we to construct a more
general framework, untestable assumptions used in the model construc-
tion process would still be a target for criticism.
Although we believe our analysis is compelling, it is simply less defin-
itive than would be the case were the NES item measured at the interval
or ratio level. For the sake of completeness and so that the reader may
judge all the evidence for him or herself, we now report the findings we
would have obtained had we confined attention to models without a
cutpoint change. In that vein, recall that under model M1, the means and
variances were allowed to vary over the survey years, but the cutpoint
was the same in all years; we rejected this model because it did not fit
the data at any reasonable significance level, using L2. However, given
the large sample size, one might try to argue that model M1 provides a
reasonable description of the data (this is not an argument we would
endorse, but it is not an uncommon type of argument). Were we to proceed
along such lines, a natural model to consider next is M9; this is a special
case of model M1 in which the logarithms of the variances change linearly
over time. Were we to accept the results from model M9 at face value,
the trend coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .05 level
(.023; SE p .005). However, if we use the conditional-likelihood test, M9
is inferior to M1 ( ), which sug-
2 2L [M ]  L [M ] p 13.75; df p 6; P p .039 1
gests that a linear trend does not adequately capture the temporal change
in attitudinal variability. In addition, the variances were modeled using
polynomials up to order 3 with no improvement. Next, inspection of the
variances estimated under model M1 suggested model M10, in which there
are three distinct variances ( for 1980, 1984, and 1988; for 1986; and2 2j j1 2
for 1990, 1992, and 1994). Under this model, is greater than (using2 2 2j j j3 3 1
the .05 level), suggesting (with the exception of 1986) that polarization is
higher in the 1990s than the 1980s. A similar pattern shows up in model
M11; this model is obtained from M10 by constraining the means (except
for the mean in 1992) to be identical.
The ad hoc models M10 and M11 do not support the hypothesis that
polarization is monotonically increasing over time, but they do suggest
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ex-post facto that the variability of abortion attitudes is greater in the
1990s than in the 1980s (save 1986). However, none of the models above
come close to fitting the data at conventionally used significance levels,
and if the BIC is used as a model selection criterion, model M8, in which
the variability of abortion attitudes is constant, is still clearly preferred
to any of those just considered.
DISCUSSION
Sociologists and journalists have argued that recent “cultural wars” over
politicized moral issues have resulted in rising levels of attitude polari-
zation and social conflict. According to these writers, the level of polar-
ization and fragmentation among the public as a whole is so irreconcilable
that democratic compromise on these issues is increasingly difficult, posing
a strong threat to the viability of American political institutions. The
controversy over abortion exemplifies the concerns of these writers, who
often use this as the leading example with which to make their case.
Typically, however, no empirical evidence of increased attitudinal polar-
ization is presented; rather, the purported increase is indirectly inferred
from the outcomes with which such polarization is (in theory) associated.
In an important contribution, DiMaggio et al. (1996) examined temporal
trends in public opinion data to assess this thesis, finding little evidence
of increasing polarization, with opinions about abortion constituting the
major exception. In general, however, their conclusions may be misleading
because they analyze nominal and ordinal opinion items using methods
designed for interval measurements. In particular, DiMaggio et al. in-
appropriately analyze both the GSS data and the NES data on abortion.
We develop new methods for studying opinion polarization using or-
dinal data. In our model, a generalization of the cumulative probit model,
the latent attitude toward abortion follows a normal distribution at each
time point. In contrast to DiMaggio et al., our results do not suggest an
increase in polarization. Interestingly, with respect to abortion, one of the
most controversial public issues, our results suggest support for the more
general conclusion in DiMaggio et al.: public opinion has not polarized
much over the last 25 years. Nonetheless, two caveats are in order. First,
because our model is not appropriate for analyzing the GSS data on
abortion, our conclusions are based solely on the analysis of the NES
item; it is conceivable that an appropriate analysis of the GSS data would
find evidence of increasing polarization. Second, the latent variable in our
analysis is assumed to follow a normal distribution, and in our analysis
of the 1980–94 data, we allowed the cutpoint separating categories 3 and
4 to change after 1988. Although we offered both theoretical and empirical
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support for this analysis, because we are using ordinal data and must
therefore make assumptions that cannot be fully tested, our analysis will
always be open to criticism by those who want to maintain that polari-
zation in abortion attitudes has been increasing. However, at this point,
we believe that our analyses are strong enough to place the burden of
proof upon the would-be critic. In future work on this topic, we intend
to extend our model to include distributions other than the normal, and
we intend to develop appropriate methods for studying polarization when
multiple items are used to measure the underlying attitude (as is the case
in the GSS).
Do the culture wars exist? Proponents of the culture wars hypothesis
claim that America is becoming increasingly divided over politicized
moral issues. Abortion is an issue where the debate is particularly divisive.
Hunter (1991, 1996), for instance, argues that because of the sound-bite
society we live in, special interest groups and political organizations at-
tempt to inflame public opinion about abortion and undermine their op-
ponents rather than participate in genuine debate. This contributes to a
“hollowing out” of the possibility of achieving consensus and raises the
specter of violence as a means of imposing one’s beliefs upon others.
However, our results show that there is no evidence that Americans as a
whole became more divided over abortion rights between 1972 and 1980
nor between 1980 and 1994. In the lag between submission and publi-
cation of this article, new NES data have become available, and we have
extended the 1980–94 analysis to 2000. In addition to models analogous
to those considered in this paper, we designed new models to ascertain
whether polarization had increased during the 1990s. Our results indicate
no increase in polarization in abortion attitudes between 1980 and 2000
(complete results available from authors on request). While the contem-
porary culture wars have been portrayed as a threat to democratic in-
stitutions, our evidence suggests that, at least with respect to the debate
over abortion rights, the American public is no more divided now than
in the past.
APPENDIX A
Estimation of the Model
Our model extends the usual cumulative probit model to allow for het-
eroscedasticity and variable cutpoints. Let Y denote an observed ordinal
variable with response categories j p 1, . . . , J, let Y∗ denote a metrical
latent variable, and let denote a vector of covariates. Under the modelX
herein, the distribution of Y∗, given (denoted ) is normal,X p x f[y ∗ Fx]
with mean and standard deviation , where v is a vector ofm(x; v) j(x; v)
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parameters to be estimated. The observed variable Y is a quantized ver-
sion of the latent variable Y∗; for each level x of the covariates, Y p 1
if and only if , if and only if , . . .∗ ∗Y ! t (x; v) Y p 2 t (x; v) ! Y ≤ t (x; v)1 1 2
, . . . , and if and only if It follows that∗Y p J Y 1 t (x; v).J1
t (x; v)  m(x; v) t (x; v)  m(x; v)j j1prob(Y p jFX p x) p F  F , (A1)[ ] [ ]j(x; v) j(x; v)
where denotes the distribution function of the standard normal distri-F
bution, and for all Asx,t (x; v) p ,t (x; v) p .0 J
t (x; v)  m(x; v) k [t (x; v)  l ]  [m(x; v)  l ]j x j x xz (x; v) p p , (A2)j
j(x; v) k j(x; v)x
it is evident that at each level of the covariates, the parameters andm(x; v)
are identified only up to location and scale. In the usual cumulativej(x; v)
probit model, it is assumed that neither the cutpoints nor thet (x; v)j
variance depends on . Therefore, only two restrictions need be2j (x; v) x
imposed to identify the model; the restrictions andt (x; v) p t p 01 1
are conventionally used, though other restrictions could2 2j (x; v) p j p 1
be used and might be more desirable in certain types of applications.
We now briefly discuss maximum-likelihood estimation of the extended
model. We assume the parameter vector v is identified (as is the case for
the models considered in this paper).
Let , . . . , n, denote the observed data (hereafter D), and,(x ,y ),i p 1i i
for j p 1, . . . , J, let The log likelihood isy p 1 if y p j, otherwise.ij i
n J
ln L(v; D) p y n ln prob(Y p jFX p x) ln ij i
ip1 jp1
n J
p y ln {F[z (x; v)]  F[z (x; v)]}, (A3) ij j j1
ip1 jp1
and this is to be maximized with respect to v.
Under the usual types of regularity conditions (see, e.g., Amemiya 1985),
a maximum-likelihood estimator is a solution of the likelihood equa-v̂ of v
tions:
n J
lnL(v; D)  prob(Y p jFX px )i i ip y [prob(Y p jFX px )] ij i i i
v vip1 jp1
n J
y f[z (x ; v)]f[z (x ; v)]/v  f[z (x ; v)]f[z (x ; v)]/vij j i j i j1 i j1 ip p 0.
F[z (x ; v)]  F[z (x ; v)]ip1 jp1 j i j1 i
(A4)
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In large samples, is approximately normally distributed with mean vv̂
and covariance matrix . The matrix can be estimated con-1n  (v)  (v)
sistently by ; for the model here,2 ′{(1/n) # [ ln L (v; D)]/(vv )}  1
n J2 2 lnL(v; D)  prob(Y p jFX px )i i i1p y [(prob(Y p jFX p x )] ij i i i′ ′[ ]vv vvip1 jp1
2[prob(Y p jFX p x )]i i i
prob(Y p jFX px ) [prob(Y p jFX px )]i i i i i i , (A5)′v v
with
2 prob(Y p jFX px ) f[z (x ; v)] f[z (x ; v)]i i i j i j ip′ ′vv v v
2 f[z (x ; v)]j if[z (x ; v)]j i ′vv
f[z (x ; v)] f[z (x ; v)]j1 i j1 i ′v v
2 f[z (x ; v)]j1 if[z (x ; v)] . (A6)j1 i ′vv
To estimate the parameters and their standard errors, a modified Newton-
Raphson algorithm using numerical derivatives for (A4) and (A5), imple-
mented in the Stata package, was used. For further details, see the de-
scription of the linear form routine in the section on maximum-
likelihood estimation in the Stata reference manual (StataCorp 1997). The
code used to implement the model in Stata is available online from the
authors.
Because our covariate (X) is discrete, we (in order to avoid computing
the log likelihood for each individual observation) maximized the equiv-
alent grouped data log likelihood:
T J
lnL(v; D) p n ln [prob(Y p jFX p t)], (A7) tj i i
tp1 jp1





There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which
one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? You can
just tell me the number of the opinion you choose.
TABLE B1




1 . . . . . . . . . . Abortion should never be permitted. By law, abortion should never
be permitted.
2 . . . . . . . . . . Abortion should be permitted only
if the life and health of the
woman is in danger.
The law should permit abor-
tion only in case of rape, in-
cest, or when the woman’s
life is in danger.
3 . . . . . . . . . . Abortion should be permitted if,
due to personal reasons, the
woman would have difficulty in
caring for the child.
The law should permit abor-
tion for reasons other than
rape, incest, or danger to
the woman’s life, but only
after the need for the abor-
tion has been clearly
established.
4 . . . . . . . . . . Abortion should never be forbidden,
since one should not require a
woman to have a child she
doesn’t want.
By law, a woman should al-
ways be able to obtain an
abortion as a matter of per-
sonal choice.
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